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TROXEL v. GRANVILLE: IMPLICATIONS FOR AT RISK
CHILDREN AND THE AMICUS CURIAE ROLE OF
UNIVERSITY-BASED INTERDISCIPLINARY CENTERS
FOR CHILDREN
BarbaraBennett Woodhouse*
Sacha Coupet**
This symposium is devoted to the Supreme Court's first family law case
of the new century. In this case, a pair of grieving grandparents, the Troxels,
sought to protect their future access to the children of their deceased son.
The children's mother, Tommie Granville, objected to the order as an
unconstitutional state intervention in her parental autonomy. The Troxel case
was quickly labeled "the grandparents' rights case" by the media. In fact, the
Troxels did not claim a constitutional right to visit with their grandchildren.
They relied on a state statute providing that "any person" might seek
visitation with a child, upon showing that it was in the child's best interest.
Nor were any claims raised by the children, who were not represented by
counsel or a guardian ad litem. The record was devoid of any claims to a
constitutional right asserted by the children themselves to continued contact
with their grandparents. Nevertheless, advocates for children recognized that
the case had potentially broad implications for children at risk of foster care
placement. If, in deciding Troxel, the Court were to issue a sweeping
statement about the primacy of biological parents' rights, it might unduly
limit the power of states and family courts to protect children's relationships
with kin, extended family, and de facto caretakers.

*
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse received her J.D. from Columbia University and was a
Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Center for Children's Policy Practice and Research
at the University of Pennsylvania from 1988 to 2001. She is currently a Professor of Law at
the University of Florida's Fredric G. Levin College of Law, where she holds the David H.
Leven Chair in Faniily Law. She is founder and Director of the Center on Children and the
Law, at Levin College of Law, a new addition to the ranks of university-based
interdisciplinary centers for children (UBICCs) described in the article.
** Sacha Coupet received her Ph.D. from the University of Michigan in clinical
psychology and her J.D. from the University of Pennsylvania. After serving as a law clerk in
both appellate and trial courts, she will begin a fellowship at the University of Michigan Law
School where she will be representing children in court cases and teaching in the clinical
program.
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Children do not vote, do not attend fund raising dinners, and are sorely
lacking in political clout. Poor children are especially unrepresented in the
halls of power. This vacuum has long been partially filled by
nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") such as the Children's Defense
Fund and professional organizations such as the American Academy of
Pediatrics ("AAP"). Recently, a number of projects have evolved in
universities around the country seeking to mobilize the expertise of scholars
from a range of disciplines. The goal of these projects is to assist decisionmakers addressing children and youth policies to understand the legal,
scientific, and sociological contexts of their decisions. Universities provide
an ideal setting for collaboration between the professions and researchers
offering opportunities to explore policy, practice, and research in areas such
as child development, family sociology, medicine and health sciences, and
the law. Universities are uniquely situated to perform the public mission of
encouraging the dissemination of research. We have coined the term
"University-Based Interdisciplinary Children's Centers" or "UBICC"
(pronounced "you-bick," plural "you-bix"), to denote a new breed of
university-based NGO, the mission of which is to mobilize interdisciplinary
resources to educate lawmakers and courts, and to promote policies that
meet the complex needs of children.
This essay will explore the potential threat that was posed by Troxel to
children at risk of foster care placement. It will also highlight the potential
role of UBICCs in advocating for children's needs and in influencing the
courts and legislatures to take a developmentally-informed, child-centered
perspective in evaluating laws and public policies. It will focus on the
engagement of one specific UBICC, the Center for Children's Policy
Practice and Research at University of Pennsylvania, in Troxel v. Granville.
The authors of this essay, Prof. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, and Dr.
Sacha Coupet, were part of an interdisciplinary team effort to author an
amicus brief which would highlight the implications of the case for children
in state care and for children at risk of entering the foster care system. 1
Having clerked at the United States Supreme Court, Woodhouse has seen
first hand the value of an amicus or "friend of the court" brief in providing
the Justices with a broader context and a fuller understanding of the
ramifications of a particular decision. Dr. Coupet's special expertise in the
study of kinship care within the African-American community made her an
especially valuable team member.
1. The team assembled to work on this case spanned a range of disciplines, from law
to social work, to psychology and sociology, to psychiatry. See infra p. 862-63.
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Because our Constitution confers authority on courts only where there is
a specific "case or controversy," constitutional issues are invariably
presented in a fact specific context. The Court is never asked to answer
some broad theoretical question, such as, "What are the consequences for
children of recognizing a parental right to deny contact with extended
family?" Instead, it must decide a controversy between two or more adverse
parties. Since the parties focus on their own narrow interests, and the facts
of their dispute, larger implications of a decision may be left unexplored.
Supreme Court Justices have often served many years on the federal
bench before they are elevated to the highest court. After many years of
deciding cases, they become experts in certain subject matter areasincluding antitrust, tax law, and federal legislation of all kinds. Family law
and child welfare law, however, are rarely on the Justices' ordinary menu.
Few family law cases actually come before the United States Supreme
Court, since family law is an area generally left to the states. Accordingly,
the role of the amicus brief in a case like Troxel is especially important as it
can provide background knowledge in an unfamiliar area so that the Justices
understand the public policy implications of a particular decision.
The amicus brief we submitted on behalf of CCPPR is reprinted at the
end of this article. Before drafting the brief, the Co-Directors and team
members met as a group to discuss the policy issues and to map out a
strategy. Dr. Carol Wilson Spigner, former Assistant Commissioner of the
Children's Bureau, drawing on her deep knowledge of the child welfare
system and children's needs, provided a key phrase that we used as a
compass to guide our strategy. We wanted to urge the Justices to avoid
"sharpening the battle of rights" over children. We knew that "at risk"
children needed all the caretaking resources they could muster and the key
to their welfare was cooperation, not acrimony, between those who loved
them.
Dr. Spigner's contribution illustrates how a UBICC law and policy team
can mobilize experts in a non-law field to make timely interventions in
appellate court cases and legislative reform. When a legislature is drafting or
seeking public comment on a piece of proposed legislation, members of
UBICC may be asked to participate in an advisory committee or to provide
testimony and briefings to legislators. Another context in which law is
formed is the appellate case in which higher level courts make
pronouncements about the meaning of a specific law (e.g., Suter v. Artist
M. 2) or about constitutional doctrine (e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster
2.

500 U.S. 915 (1991).

HeinOnline -- 32 Rutgers L.J. 859 2000-2001

RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 32:857

Families for Equality and Reform3); Moore v. City of East Cleveland4 ;
Stanley v. Illinois5). In cases raising constitutional or statutory issues of
importance to children, a UBICC that has been monitoring upcoming cases
is in an excellent position to organize a team to draft an amicus brief. Or it
may join with others in authoring or signing a brief submitted on behalf of a
coalition of child advocacy groups.
One important issue for any UBICC is defining its core constituency and
adopting policies about its involvement in litigation. CCPPR, at its
formation, identified its constituency as "at risk" children and youth.
CCPPR also had consciously chosen not to engage in direct representation
of parties bringing impact litigation or class action law suits. While such
suits are an important element in law reform and often serve to mobilize
public institutions to better serve children and vindicate children's rights,
direct participation comes at a price. Advocacy organizations engaging in
such work must assume an adversarial role towards the agencies and
government entities whom they are suing. The advocacy organization is then
limited in its ability to participate collaboratively in systems reform. When
developing reforms in response to a successful lawsuit, the defendant cities
and states will turn to resources that have been less directly involved in the
prosecution of the case. CCPPR opted to avoid such direct conflict, in order
to remain available as a collaborator and consultant.
Good laws and policies depend upon accurate social science and an
understanding of developmental and medical issues, as well as on a clear
understanding of constitutional principles and family law jurisprudence. The
composition of a law and policy team depends upon the primary issues in a
case. For example, CCPPR submitted an amicus brief in Brian B., 6 a case
that addressed the question whether adolescents tried and convicted as adults
have a constitutional right to education while incarcerated. To research and
write the brief, Woodhouse assembled a team that included specialists in
juvenile justice, corrections, economics, child development, neurology and
education theory. The goal of the brief was to inform the judges of the
unique developmental and neurological needs of the adolescent and the
economic consequences to these children and society of depriving them of
education. Social science data reviewed in our brief made clear that the
policy of withholding education was irrational and arbitrary and thus
unconstitutional. The Troxel case, by contrast, posed the question whether
3.
4.
5.
6.

431
431
405
203

U.S. 816 (1977).
U.S. 494 (1977).
U.S.645 (1972).
F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2000).
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parents' constitutional rights were violated when states intervened to protect
children's relationships with family and kin outside the nuclear family
circle. Instead of focusing on the educational needs of incarcerated youths, it
focused on the emotional needs of dependent children.
The State of Washington had passed a law that gave standing to anyone
at any time to seek court-ordered visitation, which was to be granted if the
court found that visitation would serve the best interest of the child. Mr. and
Mrs. Troxel had sought and won expanded contact with the two young
daughters of their deceased son. The girls' mother, Tommie Granville,
protested that the court order violated her Fourteenth Amendment liberty to
direct the upbringing of her children, as established in a line of cases from
the United States Supreme Court beginning with Meyer v. Nebraska7 and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters.8 The Washington Supreme Court agreed with
Granville, and struck down its own state's law as violative of the Federal
Constitution. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
the case.
Many groups filed amicus briefs in the Troxel case, including parents'
rights groups, grandparents' rights groups, bar and professional groups,
women's advocates, and civil liberties groups. Before deciding whether to
submit a brief, or join another brief, CCPPR's law staff discussed issues and
strategies at length, by telephone and e-mail, with many of these groups. We
decided that the needs of the constituency with which we were most deeply
concerned--children at risk of placement or already in state care-were not
adequately represented by any other potential amicus. CCPPR's goal was to
insure that the Justices considered the impact of their decision on these
children in the "public law" systems, not just on children caught in the
"private law" sphere of parent-grandparent conflict or acrimonious divorce.
While the CCPPR team agreed with the Washington court's finding that
parents are constitutionally entitled to deference in raising their children, we
were also highly sensitive to the important role played by extended family,
partners and kin in creating a safety net for children at risk of placement in
the foster care system. CCPPR sought permission to file an amicus brief
drawing the Court's attention to these other contexts in which children's
relationships with nonparents must be protected from disruption. Permission
was granted, with no opposition from either party.
It may seem presumptuous to believe that such a brief would be helpful
to nine able jurists deciding a hotly litigated and well briefed cased.
7.
8.

262 U.S. 390 (1923).
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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However, the case of Stanley v. Illinois illustrates what can happen when the
Court decides a family law case without sufficient perspectives on the
broader implications of the case. In Stanley, an unmarried biological father
who had, lived with and raised his children challenged a state law that
accorded him no special parental rights when their mother died. The Court,
in vindicating Mr. Stanley's claim, made unnecessarily sweeping statements
about the rights of biological fathers. Legislatures and lower courts
interpreted this dicta as conferring rights on absent and unknown fathers, a
principle that threw the law of adoption and child protection into chaos. The
Court was forced to backtrack, step by step. It clarified in a line of
subsequent cases that, while a father has a unique opportunity to develop a
protected relationship, he must seize his opportunity by acknowledging and
supporting his child in order to claim constitutional protection of the
relationship. 9 The goal of the CCPPR intervention was to minimize the risk
of a similar unnecessary and unintended disruption of child welfare and
family policy.
The Troxel team was lead by an academic (Professor Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse) who is admitted to practice in the Supreme Court, and has
authored or co-authored a number of briefs to the Court in cases involving
children's rights.' 0 The team included Dr. Sacha Coupet, then a third year
law student, whose doctoral thesis in clinical psychology studied the role of
African-American grandmothers in providing care giving for children. A
third year law student visiting from Harvard University, Ms. Keren Rabin,
researched the nonparent visitation statutes of the fifty states. In addition,
the team included a senior Masters of Social Work student, Alyssa Burrell
Cowan, and sociologist Professor Richard Gelles, of the University of
Pennsylvania School of Social Work. Dr. Gelles is a specialist in family
violence and an author of the recently enacted Federal Adoption and Safe
Families Act, which stresses the need to involve children's extended family
resources and kin in child protection and foster care. Also part of the team
was University of Pennsylvania School of Social Work Professor Carol
Wilson Spigner. Dr. Spigner, as noted earlier, served in the Children's
Bureau in Washington, the federal agency that is charged with child
9. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); see Barbara Bennett Woodhouse,
Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV.
1746, 1804 (1993).
10. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Doe v. Kirchner, 515 U.S. 1152 (1995)
(No. 94-1644); Motion of Concerned Academics for Leave to Submit Brief Amici Curiae and
Brief Amici Curiae in Support of Stay Application of Petitioner Jessica DeBoer, DeBoer v.
DeBoer, 509 U.S. 938 (1993) (No. A-64).
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protection at the federal level. Dr. Spigner provided expertise on systemic
barriers, funding, and race and class. Another key team member was
pediatrician/psychiatrist Dr. Annie Steinberg, of the University of
Pennsylvania Medical School who provided the psychiatric and
developmental perspectives on the child's need for permanency and stability
in attachment relationships and the effects, both psychological and
neurological, of disruption of such relationships. Finally, Professor Elisabeth
Slusser Kelly, Director of Biddle Law Library at University of
Pennsylvania, provided research resources and consultation to the team.
The first step was to provide team members with relevant legal
materials, and answer questions about the legal principles. After discussion
of the developmental and social issues, the team developed a strategy and a
central policy theme. The strategy was to urge the Court not to make
sweeping statements about parents' rights in the course of deciding the
Troxel case, but to decide it on the narrow facts presented. As noted earlier,
the facts were quite specific to this case. The grandparents in this case had
never been the primary caretakers or coresident with the children, and the
mother was not seeking to terminate all contact. The mother was a fit and
competent parent and no indications existed of risk to the children. The
children were not parties to the case and had expressed no position with
respect to visitation. Yet the danger existed that the Court, which does not
handle many family law cases, might approach the case as an opportunity to
enunciate an abstract hierarchy of constitutional rights between adults,
placing the autonomy of the biological parent first, regardless of specific
facts, attachment relationships, and the needs of children. The "childcentered" theme that we adopted focused on the critical importance of sound
policies in custody and visitation, the need to approach child custody and
visitation on a case-by-case basis, and the harm that would result from
(using Spigner's key phrase) "sharpening the battle of rights" among adult
family members. We decided to focus instead on the benefits of maximizing
children's family resources. We also decided to bring a child-centered
perspective to the abstract constitutional arguments regarding the
preservation of family autonomy. Our strategy was to use stories of real
children from our clinical caseload to show the other side of Troxel: that
excessive deference to the rights of the biological parent might well result in
more children being raised by the state, rather than growing up in families of
their own.
Based on this discussion, the team leader drafted an outline and assigned
each team member the responsibility of writing or of providing research for
a specific section of the brief, according to his or her area of expertise. The
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team leader assembled all the texts, edited them, and harmonized them into a
first draft. This draft was then circulated to all members for comment and
correction and was discussed at various team meetings. The argument was
further refined and additional scientific, sociological, and legal sources were
provided.
In the past, the difficulty and expense of producing a printed brief
conforming with the precise rules of the Court on size, color of cover, type,
and font has been a substantial financial and logistical barrier. Electronic
publishing has greatly reduced these barriers. Thanks to a donation
supporting printing and filing costs, CCPPR was able to print and file its
briefs at a very modest cost. An electronic text of the brief was sent to a
professional printing service. The brief was then served on the various
parties to the case and filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. The
authors hope that the Amicus Brief speaks for itself, or rather speaks for a
population of children who are often denied a voice.
It is impossible to know what effect, if any, an amicus brief has on the
Court's deliberations. However, the Court's decision in the Troxel case
definitely avoids the dangers of oversimplification. As Justice O'Connor
remarked from the bench in announcing her plurality opinion, the Court was
as divided as the family in this case. The Court delivered no fewer than six
separate opinions-a plurality (four votes to affirm based on Justice
O'Connor's reasoning), two concurrences in the judgment (voting to affirm,
but for different reasons than those given by the plurality), and three dissents
(voting to reverse and remand, but disagreeing with each other on the
reasoning). By our count, six Justices believe that Tommie Granville's
Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated (Rehnquist, O'Connor, Breyer,
Ginsburg, Souter, and Thomas), two were unpersuaded, and would reverse
and remand the case for further proceedings (Kennedy and Stevens), and one
would take the federal courts out of the area completely (Scalia).
The plurality, written by Justice O'Connor and joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, concluded that the Washington
statute, "as applied" in this case, violated the mother's constitutional right to
decide how to rear her children.1 I By using an "as applied" analysis,
O'Connor carefully confined the scope of the discussion. She framed the
case so it was unnecessary to decide whether the Washington statute would
be unconstitutional in all circumstances, or even to decide whether the
Washington court was correct in its constitutional analysis. 12 Instead, she
i1. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,
plurality opinion).
12. Id. at 73.
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confined her opinion to critiquing how the Washington law was applied to
this family.
While she noted that the statute's "any person at any time" approach
was "breathtakingly broad," she expressed doubt that this statute or other
visitation statutes should be treated as per se unconstitutional or
unconstitutional on their face (as would be, for example, laws that
prohibited racial groups from intermarryingl 3 ). In subsequent remarks
stressing the limited role of the Court in setting family policy, O'Connor
explains,
[w]e refused to hold that such statutes are per se invalid. Rather, the States
are free to provide for nonparental visitation as long as they provide
appropriate weight to the parent's determination of the child's best interests.
In this way, we have given the States the necessary space to create structures
14
that promote the best interests of children.
The O'Connor opinion begins by affirming that parents enjoy a
constitutional liberty interest, under case law articulating the substantive due
process doctrines of the Fourteenth Amendment, to control the upbringing of
their children. A long line of cases, beginning with Meyer v. Nebraska15 and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,16 firmly establishes this principle. In a
paragraph that has sometimes been quoted out of context, she summarized
the law as follows:
Accordingly, so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e.,
is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the
private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to
make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children. 17
Some early interpretations of the opinion seized on this sentence and
concluded that grandparent visitation orders may never be entered against
the wishes of a fit parent. In context, the opinion clearly does not stand for
this proposition, which would cast doubt on a host of state statutes and
13. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
14. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, The Supreme Court and the Family, Address to
"Family Law 2000" Conference of the Philadelphia Bar (Nov. 17, 2000), in U. PA. J. CONST.
L. (forthcoming).
15. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
16. 268 U.S. 510(1925).
17. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69 (emphasis added).
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family court practices. The plurality went on to explain, that "[t]he problem
here is not that the Washington Superior Court intervened, but that when it
did so, it gave no material weight at all to Granville's determination of her
daughters' best interests."' 18 In short, there was no showing of facts or
circumstances that took this particular case outside the "norm" of
nonintervention, or justified the family judge's questioning of this parent's
decisions.
O'Connor examined specific ways in which the state family court failed
to justify the need for intervention and failed to give due deference to
Tommie Granville's choices. 19 For one, the judge seemed to adopt the view
that grandparent visitation was presumptively in every child's best
interest. 20 Instead, O'Connor reasoned, parents' choices about intergenerational relationships should be accorded deference by the state, here, in
the guise of a judge, and presumed to be in the child's best interest, unless
there is a showing to the contrary. 2 1 Furthermore, the judge ignored the fact
that the mother had not foreclosed all contact but merely wanted to limit
contact to one day per month, while the grandparents wanted far more. 2 2 As
the opinion implies, the State, as well as the child and the grandparents, may
have a weightier interest in avoiding a complete severance of the
grandparent-grandchild relationship than in second-guessing a parent's
23
decisions about the time, place and manner of such contacts.
What many media accounts missed in analyzing the plurality opinion is
its purposeful narrowing of the issues. O'Connor takes a true common law
approach to the task, examining the case before her and leaving other issues
to future decisions. Noting that each of the fifty states has a visitation
statute, she uses comparisons with these statutes to suggest the myriad of
situations that arise when third parties seek visitation and the many ways
state legislatures have found of protecting children while respecting the
parent's autonomy-i.e., imposing burdens of proof, heightening evidentiary
standards, or requiring various elements, such as harm to the child or total
foreclosure of contact. 2 4 Rather than deciding whether a given approach is
constitutionally mandated, the plurality opinion leaves all of these statutes

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at
ld. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

69.
69-73.
69.
69-70.
71.
71-72.
73-74, 73 n. 1.
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intact to be addressed on a case by case basis. 25 The plurality also refuses to
decide whether, as the Washington court believed, harm to the child is a
necessary element. O'Connor's approach is consistent with her concern for
federalism and stresses that constitutional protections in this area are best
"'elaborated with care."' 2 6 The opinion also gives deference to the roles of
judges, noting that "the constitutionality of any standard for awarding
visitation turns on the specific manner in which that standard is applied,"
and that "much of the adjudication in this context occurs on a case by case
27
basis."
The core of the plurality opinion is quite simple and limited: given that
parents enjoy constitutional protection of their child-rearing decisions, the
State may not intervene without giving "some special weight" to a fit
parent's decision. That is precisely what the Washington court failed to do
for Tommie Granville, and no more need or should be said. Questions of
how to balance various rights and interests are left for another day. In this
sense, the plurality opinion was judicially conservative, as many in the
world of child welfare and family law had hoped it would be. When the
Court decides to enter an area as unfamiliar as family law, it runs a
heightened risk of leaving behind misguided dicta. The plurality approach
was also sensitive to the needs of the parties for closure. By declining to
remand, it permitted Tommie Granville to get on with her life. Because it
analyzed the statute "as applied," it also left room for the gradual
development of the law of third party visitation as new cases presenting new
facts come before the courts. While some have criticized it for leaving too
much unsaid, the CCPPR team would join with those who applaud it for
declining to dictate specific standards and parameters, beyond those
necessary to decide the specific case. Justices Souter and Thomas provided
the fifth and sixth votes for the outcome, but they did not endorse
O'Connor's narrow approach.
Advocates for children now must delve into the reasoning behind each
justice's opinion in order to read the tea leaves. We must ask what the two
concurrences, and the dissents of Kennedy, Stevens and Scalia, tell us about
how the Court is likely to approach future cases involving State intervention
in parents' privacy to protect children's contacts with third parties such as
grandparents, kin and partners or de facto parents? By our analysis, a clear
majority of the Justices agrees that a statute granting visitation to "any
person at any time" based on a pure best interest standard could lead to
25. Id. at 73.
26. Id. (quoting the concurrence of Justice Kennedy).
27. Id.
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unconstitutional interventions. 2 8 A clear majority also appears to accept
that, under certain circumstances, states may be justified in ordering third
party visitation against the wishes of a fit parent. The crucial issue that
divided the Court actually was more procedural than substantive, and first
surfaced at oral argument. The Justices startled the parties by asking what
the Court should do when faced with a state court judgment striking down a
statute as facially invalid, when the statute is unconstitutional in some but
not all possible applications. It was clear, even then, that the Justices were in
sharp disagreement over this complex and arcane point of Supreme Court
practice and procedure.
Justice Souter, in his concurrence, took the position that the Court
simply should have affirmed, and he "would say no more." 2 9 He disagreed
with O'Connor's adoption of an "as applied" analysis, given that the
30
Washington court had found its own state statute invalid on its face.
Parting ways with both O'Connor and Souter on this procedural point,
justice Kennedy would have remanded for reconsideration. He believed the
Washington court had misinterpreted the Federal Constitution, and erred in
holding that "the best interest of the child standard is never [constitutionally]
appropriate in third-party visitation cases." 3 1 Further, he believed that the
Washington court should be given another crack at the task of interpreting
32
its statute.
Justice Stevens' dissent, like Justice Kennedy's, argues for a remand
based on concerns regarding the Washington court's sweeping language. Of
all the opinions, Stevens' is the most explicit in discussing the rights and
interests of other members of the family constellation, including those of
children. He charges Justice O'Connor with suggesting that "children are so
much chattel" when she refers to an "independent third party interest" in
them. 33 She counters that, in adopting such terminology, she simply is
recognizing that visitation statutes may pose questions of constitutional
magnitude, as they implicate constitutionally protected interests of
parents. 34 Given O'Connor's narrow approach, addressing only those issues
28. David Meyer provides an excellent breakdown of the score card of opinions in the
case. See David M. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy After Troxel and Carhart,
UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1143 (2001).

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 76.
Id. at 94 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 101-02.
Id. at 89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 64-65 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
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raised in this case, her silence on issues of children's rights or interests in
family relationships cannot be interpreted as a rejection of the principle that
children have certain protected rights to family relationships.
The only radical voice in this case was that of Justice Scalia. He has
fairly consistently rejected the line of substantive due process cases that
identified various "unenumerated rights" protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, including those of parents to control their children. In his view,
while such rights may be "inalienable" as a matter of political theory, it is
the province of the states under the Ninth Amendment to protect them, and
the federal courts should abstain from the issue. At least Scalia is consistent,
opposing federal court intervention to protect parenting decisions of all
35
kinds, whether in the context of abortion or of visitation.
Finally, Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, seemed drawn in
two diametrically opposed directions. On the one hand, he seemed
sympathetic to Scalia's view that the Court exceeds its power by secondguessing state family law policies. 3 6 But since the parties did not raise this
issue and the Court was relying on its Fourteenth Amendment precedents,
Thomas did not engage this thorny issue. 37 However, unlike O'Connor, he
would have made explicit that the appropriate standard for examining the
constitutionality of the intervention was "strict scrutiny." 38 This standard of
review is the highest measure of oversight of state action requiring the state
to show a "compelling interest" and to prove that its intervention is narrowly
tailored to advance only that interest.
Clearly, it was no accident that the plurality opinion refrains from
specifying a particular level of scrutiny and instead speaks of the need to
accord "some special weight" or "material weight" to the parent's decisions.
The CCPPR team was particularly pleased that the plurality had shown such
restraint. We believe that family law cases are too complex for a one-sizefits-all constitutional standard. Strict scrutiny may be appropriate when a
lone individual's rights are pitted against the awesome powers of the State.
In an area such as family law, where courts are often called upon to mediate
competing rights and interests of parents, children, and other family
members, the Constitution will surely require a more nuanced balancing
than is provided by the strict scrutiny standard.

35. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
LAW (1997).
36. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
37. Id. at 80 n.l.
38. Id. at 80.
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What does all this mean for "at risk" children and their advocates?
Troxel definitely does not mean that courts are powerless to protect
children's extended family relationships in the face of a fit parent's
objections. While parents do have a protected liberty interest that must be
accorded appropriate deference, this may be accomplished in a number of
ways. For now, experimentation with the proper balance between the
interests of the state, those of parents, and those of other family members, is
left to the laboratory of state legislatures and state courts, with Supreme
Court oversight as an outer limit, to be provided as the case law evolves.
Just as Stanley v. Illinois39 opened a continuing discussion about the rights
of unwed fathers' rights, Troxel v. Granville will be the opening gambit in a
series of decisions about children's relationships with extended family. In
Troxel, however, the Court has avoided the trap it fell into in Stanley, where
it painted biological fathers' rights so broadly that it threw a whole area of
complex law into disarray and was forced to back track step by step. Instead,
the Court has started cautiously, indicating that some deference must be
shown to parental autonomy, but leaving the precise balance of state and
private interests to be elaborated in future cases.
By giving us a complex set of opinions that provides a full and nuanced
discussion of the issues but avoids broad pronouncements, the Court has
avoided coopting the policy role of the state and local governments and the
courts. "It is not the province of the Court to decide as a policy matter how
best to allocate responsibility for the rearing of children." 40 Instead, the
Court in Troxel has provided fodder for a productive discussion among
judges and academics about how to define the constitutional limits on such
policies. Discussion such as this Rutgers symposium will be part of the
dialogue that will further inform the Court as it confronts new cases
presenting new factual contexts. As state courts and law makers address
these complex issues, we hope there will be many more UBICCs, following
the model pioneered at CCPPR and other such centers, playing their part in
educating policy makers on the impact of their decisions on children at risk
of placement or already in the foster care system.
The Court's difficulty in reaching a consensus in the Troxel case
indicates that the next decades will see much debate over the constitutional
analysis of state laws and court practices that attempt to protect children's
extended family and other care giving relationships. The modern generation
of UBICCs, such as CCPPR and the newly formed Center on Children and
39. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
40. See O'Connor, supra note 14, at 4 (emphasis added).
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the Law at Levin College of Law in Florida, must work to insure that this
debate is child-centered, developmentally-informed, and pluralistic. The
voices of all children-not only children of divorce, but also children in
foster care, and not only children from affluent nuclear families, but also
poor children from disabled, immigrant and minority populations-must be
included in these debates. But an amicus brief is only as helpful to the
decision-maker as the social and psychological science that undergirds it.
More research is needed-research that is sensitive to culture, class, and
race-before we can fully understand the roles of the extended family in
preserving children's developmental potential or weigh the effects of
disrupting attachment relationships in the name of parental autonomy. By
the same token, more research is needed into the effects on family stability
of coercive court interventions, and more exploration is needed of
alternatives for resolving intrafamily disputes that are less traumatic and
disruptive to family functioning.
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